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Theme: The author examines recent changes in the Ghanaian aid and investment 
landscape as China has stepped up its relations with this donor ‘darling’. Recent oil 
discoveries further transform the financing scenarios and more established donors are 
concerned about the riskiness of this. These tensions reveal wider differences in 
approaches to development and the desires of many African governments which could 
herald big changes in the ethos and practice of development. 
 
 
Summary: These are interesting times for Ghana. The country is a long-standing donor 
‘success’, transitioned smoothly to democracy, and the economy has been performing 
reasonably well. Recently the Chinese have stepped up diplomatic relations, largely 
through aid, as they have with many African countries that serve their geopolitical and 
economic ends. But with the discovery of oil things have changed quickly. The Chinese 
and other Asian investors are seeking deals backed by oil revenues which could see 
Ghana moving away from being aid dependent. Moreover the ‘established’ donors of the 
OECD are worried about Ghana’s turn to these seemingly riskier and un-transparent 
forms of finance which they see as destabilising hard won efforts at donor harmonisation. 
Yet the Ghana story suggest deeper tensions between approaches to development –one 
centred on ‘softer’ institutional agendas and the other on ‘harder’ economic ones of 
infrastructure and growth–. The Chinese approach favours the latter, which is also 
something African governments are keen to pursue, so the changing aid and investment 
landscape may presage major changes in the ethos and direction of African development. 
 
 
 
Analysis:  
 
China in Africa: Beyond Crude Geopolitics 
China’s increased engagement with African states has excited much concern, mainly from 
those powers that have held long-standing positions of authority over Africa. These 
commentaries tend to posit crude geopolitical standpoints that impede critical analysis. 
Here I review these positions as a way of setting up the key themes for this ARI, which 
builds on the very useful analyses of Alden, Large & Soares de Oliveira and González 
Richardson.1 
 
First, there is the tendency to focus on the exceptional cases of ‘bad’ engagement, largely 
as a way of portraying China in a poor light, and extrapolating to the entire continent. This 
is not to say that China’s relations with African states are only positive, but rather that the 
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situation is complex and requires fine-grained analysis. For one thing ‘Africa’ is not a 
singular entity, and an outcome of these homogenising approaches is that African voices 
are muted, which repeats the age-old assumption that Africans lack meaningful agency 
and so have to be spoken for. In reality, as the Ghana case shows, African political 
leaders have lots of agency in dealing with the Chinese. The real issue is that this 
expression of agency goes against what established powers deem ‘appropriate’ for Africa 
and reveals major rifts in approaches to development. Ghana is interesting as it stands at 
a transition point where the power of established donors is weakening in the face of 
alternative sources of finance from the Chinese (and other rising powers) and recent oil 
discoveries add new revenue streams. 
 
Secondly, despite people talking of ‘China Inc.’, China too is not homogenous and so we 
need to avoid reading everything as some singular strategy by the Chinese. We have to 
disaggregate China in terms of it motives, interests and actors. Analysts fixate on the 
resource issue and oil security in particular. Again, this is not entirely wrong, but rather 
China’s motives are multiple, changing and at times contradictory. Economically, market 
access is also important and much of the engagement by ‘China’ with ‘Africa’ is through 
many small private enterprises which are independent of any central state agenda. 
Politically, China is aware of its growing importance internationally and plays a leadership 
role for other developing countries in international forums which is part of a discourse from 
both within China and beyond of China as a ‘responsible’ international player. Yet China is 
uncomfortable with the mantle of ‘Rising Power’. Rather than practise bullish conditionality 
in its dealings with other developing countries China prefers notions of a ‘peaceful rise’ 
based rhetorically, at least, on the idea of cooperation and mutual benefit. However, in 
many cases relationships between developing countries and China are unbalanced, so it 
is important to look beyond the rhetoric and get a clearer picture of where the relative 
gains and losses of engagement with China lie. 
 
Third, the outcomes of China’s involvement in Africa will primarily be shaped by how 
Chinese capital and parts of the Chinese state intertwine with fractions of capital and 
political blocs within Africa. The outcomes of Chinese involvement are also conditioned by 
the histories, structures and capacities of African states. Having said this, we need to 
situate China-Africa relations in terms of the global economy and thereby not overplay 
China’s role. China’s interests in Africa are not new and its current focus on resources is 
not dissimilar from other industrializing countries down the years. The tendency to over-
determine China’s role by western critics reflects their worries about competition rather 
than realities on the ground. And we need to remember that China is not the only country 
making in-roads into Africa in order to secure resources. 
 
Ghana’s Post-independence Development and China’s Role in it 
Ghana is a small economy that has traditionally relied on a narrow export base – cocoa 
and gold – and now remittances also bolster GNP. The country has shifted rapidly 
recently and so reveals, almost on a daily basis, the changing dynamics of ‘China’ and 
‘Africa’ relations. In essence Ghana has been aid dependent but a democratic ‘success’. 
Its lack of strategic resources up until 2008 meant that it runs a trade deficit with China 
and Chinese aid levels are quite low. But with discovery of oil there has been a frenzy of 
activity and we may be watching an oil state emerge, facilitated to a great degree by 
China. In this section we review briefly the history of China-Ghana relations, give a 
snapshot of Ghana’s development priorities, examine in more detail China’s recent aid 
and investments in Ghana, look at the changes that have occurred with the discovery of 
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oil, and then look at the responses of established donors. We conclude with policy 
implications. 
 
Ghana exited colonial rule with a relatively buoyant economy based on cocoa, gold and 
aluminium. It was assumed that independence would not alter this and the UK in 
particular would de facto maintain a directional role in Ghana. But the 1970s saw terms of 
trade decline, political authority fracture, and a crisis of the state. Out migration increased 
and productive capacity dwindled as infrastructures crumbled. It was against these crises 
that Jerry Rawlings was, despite a polemic of anti-imperialism, forced to turn to the 
Bretton Woods Institutions as a source of finance, which ushered in two decades of debt 
encumbrance and donor-driven policy-making. Since 1992 Ghana has been a multiparty 
democracy, but remains heavily aid dependent, though this situation is changing. 
Developmentally Ghana’s infrastructure is poor and it was estimated that a perpetual 
power crisis in the industrial sector caused growth to decline in the mid-2000s. 
 
Ghana was a mainstay of China’s African engagements during the cold war. At a banquet 
in 1964, Premier Zhou Enlai confirmed Beijing’s support for African struggles against 
imperialism (which he called ‘the poor helping the poor’) setting the stage for Africa as an 
ideological battleground with both Washington and Moscow. A key driver for China’s 
engagements with Africa through the past 50 years is a desire to contain the influence of 
hegemonic powers and also to carve out a rightful place for China in the world, born from 
a sense that China has been ‘muscled out’ of international relations. 
 
Since 1960 China has provided development assistance under bilateral diplomatic 
relations mainly in the form of grants, loans and technical assistance. However, the 
amount was relatively small. For example, between 1960 and 1970 total Chinese aid to 
Ghana amounted to US$43 million. By the early 1980s China’s direct influence had 
waned due to its inability to compete with Western aid programmes and the fact that 
China was no longer as fearful of Taiwan’s presence. Things began to pick up in the mid-
1980s and the first major co-operation agreement with Ghana was signed in 1983. Under 
this, Chinese companies signed contracts valued at US$390 million which included the 
construction of bank buildings, a woollen-sweater mill, school buildings, and water supply 
projects. In general the period of 1960 to the late-1990s was supportive, but quite low key. 
 
Recent Chinese Engagement: From Aid to Investment 
Although China has had a long-standing relationship with Ghana, it is only in recent years 
that the relationship was taken to a higher level. In 2004 Ghana began to receive grants 
and interest free loans directly from China such as a US$24 million debt relief on interest 
free loans. In 2007, Ghana received a total of US$1.15 billion from all donors (not 
including China) but Chinese aid is still only a small percentage of the total development 
assistance received by Ghana. 
 
The aid disbursed by the Chinese is generally delivered through grant aid, interest-free 
loans, and concessional loans. Aid is also project-oriented rather than sectoral or 
programme-based as encouraged by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In 
concrete terms, however, there is a blurring of aid and investment. The Chinese usually 
part pay for their resources in infrastructure and the routes for aid and investment are the 
Chinese corporations selected as part of the ‘Go Out’ Policy of 2002. However, as China’s 
overseas engagements deepen the number of actors has increased making any 
semblance of central coordination untenable. 
 
Area: Sub-Saharan Africa 
ARI 149/2010 
Date: 15/10/2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 4
China’s aid to Ghana has financed the roads, buildings and most recently, a hydroelectric 
dam (see Figure 1). Other sectors that have benefited from China’s technical support 
include education and military cooperation. There is a perception amongst Ministers and 
think-tanks in Ghana that the Chinese are serving genuine infrastructure needs, which 
they set up in opposition to the liberal governance agendas of DAC donors. This tension 
has been played out in negotiations where the Government of Ghana have generally 
conceded to the donors’ requirements in return for finance, but then foot drag and renege 
on agreements. One area of contention, associated with the market-friendly New Patriotic 
Party that governed for most of the 2000s, was around wealth creation as a development 
goal which required infrastructure and productive investment. The DAC donors of the 
multi-donor initiatives were more interested in social protection, but the NPP used the 
Millennium Challenge Account to pursue those areas of the budget it deemed important. 
And the Chinese are another source of funding which supports these agendas and comes 
without the restrictive conditions and bureaucracy of the DAC donors. 
 
Figure 1. Summary of Chinese aid in Ghana 
 
Undoubtedly the most significant Chinese engagement with Ghana has been the Bui 
hydroelectric dam. Like many Chinese-funded infrastructure projects the majority of the 
money comes from ExIm Bank. The dam will cost US$622 million; US$288 million from 
buyer credits and US$298 million as a commercial loan, whose interest will kick in after 
September 2012 when the electricity is delivered. The remaining US$40million will come 
from Ghanaian sources, part backed by cocoa exports. It should bring 400 MW of much 
needed electricity to Ghana’s struggling grid and even allow for export to neighbouring 
countries. Like Chinese projects elsewhere much of the capital equipment is Chinese. The 
Chinese workers eat imported food but for more perishable vegetables they have started 
their own farm. Chinese corporations in general do not encourage trade unions, and 
originally did not allow for it at Bui. But a deputation from the Ghana TUC argued that it 
was enshrined both in Ghanaian law and the contract. More broadly this highlights an 
important issue for the developmental impacts of China in Africa. Where local laws are 
well elaborated and, more importantly, enforced then expropriation is more difficult 
although the trade off may be lower levels of absolute investment. 
 
Project Date Modality Amount 
Ofankor-Nsawam stretch of Accra-Kumasi 
Road 
2002 Interest free loan US$30 million 
The National Theatre 2003 Grant US$2 million 
Afefi Irrigation Project   US$3 million 
Police and Military Barracks 2003 Grant US$3.9 million 
Expansion and upgrading 
telecommunication network, building of a 
school and malaria centre 
2006  US$66 million 
Security communication between agencies 2006 Concessional loan US$30 million 
The Bui Dam Project 2007 Concessional loan and 
buyers’ credit 
US$622 
million 
Various developmental projects 2007 US$4 million interest free 
loan and US$1.33 million 
grant 
US$5.33 
million 
Landing sites for fishing communities 2008 Interest free loan  US$99 million 
Office Complex for the Ministry of Defence 2008  US$7.5 million 
Pedause Presidents Lodge 2008  US$1.34 
million 
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Sinohydro and other Chinese firms are looking to deepen their footprint in Ghana and 
Africa more broadly. The Chinese seemed to have got a foothold in Africa through these 
Chinese government-supported projects and are now competing more openly for tenders 
and as one European aid official told us ‘winning in straight fights’. After the Bui Dam the 
planners are working on Bui City, which one Ghanaian official noted optimistically would 
be ‘like Dubai’. But these are essentially turnkey projects and so have limited multipliers 
locally, which is why it is imperative that African governments ensure that local content 
agreements are written into contracts. 
 
Oil and New Infrastructure Projects 
Since the turn of the millennium China’s engagement was through these focused projects, 
but in 2008 off shore oil was discovered. For a country dependent on oil imports and a 
massively over-stretched energy infrastructure this was great news. Production is 
estimated at 490 million barrels placing it in a similar league to Chad and Equatorial 
Guinea but well below Angola and Nigeria. New Gulf of Guinea reserves tend to deplete 
quickly with an estimated lifespan of around 25 years so it is a small window of 
opportunity for Ghana. 
 
The oil producers soon began arriving. Initially the discovery was through a UK-US 
consortium –Tullow and Kosmos– but before long a range of applicants was seeking 
drilling blocks. Importantly the Chinese state-owned enterprise China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation has sought to purchase Kosmos for a reported US$3 billion on the basis 
of its Ghanaian and Ugandan oil discoveries. Chinese oil firms are hampered in most oil 
fields by the established multinationals having sewn up production so they are keen to 
enter new fields or those –such as Sudan– that are the subject of boycotts and therefore 
effectively monopolies for countries prepared to overlook authoritarianism. 
 
Estimates of revenue are difficult to determine due to un-transparent contracts and 
uncertainties over the price of oil but the World Bank calculates around US$20 billion over 
20 years, peaking between 2011 and 2016.2 The danger is that with a high budget deficit 
the government will be tempted to emulate what has been dubbed the ‘Angola model’ 
where the state collateralises the oil in return for credit. Major multilaterals are urging the 
Government of Ghana to sort its underlying structural problems first rather than simply 
use the windfall rents to shore up budget deficits which will simply re-emerge once the 
boom ends. Additionally there are worries about a ‘Dutch Disease’ scenario where this 
resource exportation discourages investment and taxation in non-oil sectors through an 
appreciation of the exchange rate.3 Agriculture is one of the key sectors likely to suffer 
under this scenario. 
 
Importantly, with the discovery of oil Asian deals have stepped up in scale with a potential 
US$10 billion housing deal with Korea’s STX Group being paid for with future oil 
revenues. The negotiations for this were un-transparent and accusations have been 
circulating regarding corruption. Moreover, local realtors and building contractors have 
opposed the deal for the damage it will do to domestic firms since the Koreans would tie 
the finance to extensive use of Korean contractors. As yet the final signing of the contract 
has been postponed for ‘technical reasons’. Even more recently, in mid-September 2010, 
the Chinese have announced a US$15 billion fund for oil-related infrastructure 
development which was negotiated at the highest levels, with Ghana’s President Atta-
                                                 
2 See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGHANA/Resources/Economy-
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Mills eschewing a high level meeting in New York about the future of aid to stay on in 
Beijing for the signing ceremony.4 This signals the changing power balance in African 
development relations and the established donors in Ghana are already expressing 
concern about the transparency of these deals.5 
 
Donor Worries 
So China’s entry in Ghana and the new oil revenues raise real worries for the established 
donors. A leading aid official in Ghana noted6 of Chinese finance packages: 
 
“… a package of tied lending is only interesting when there is more limited access to the 
international market and I think that is why many African countries find this package 
interesting, because they don’t have access to the markets”. 
 
The comments reveals the tacit concerns of many donors insofar as the Chinese are 
winning the ‘straight fights’ for contracts so it is more about the competitiveness of the 
Chinese than the access to capital per se. Indeed a bilateral donor7 claimed that ExIm 
Bank backed projects were capable of ‘putting the World Bank out of business in Ghana’. 
The coming years are likely to see market access to finance more limited and so China 
may well be even more appealing. In terms of donor harmonisation Ghana has been a 
leading light, but has played a shrewd game of agreeing to donors demands while also 
backsliding to fit in with domestic concerns.8 China has been invited to become more 
involved in the Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy, but the Chinese are wary of joining, 
although they often attend meetings as observers. One interpretation is that in line with 
their experience of imperialism and realist interests in Africa the Chinese do not see 
themselves as donors. Moreover, the Chinese seem content with their independence and 
bilateralism, something that has been a feature of their development cooperation for over 
50 years, which purposefully distances them from the interests and practices of other 
powers. At the same time, the Chinese officials we were told were often frustrated during 
meetings with DAC officials who they argued usually start the conversation with ‘Let us 
set up some standards first and how much money could you contribute?’. For the Chinese 
there is much apprehension about these ‘standards’ and reaching them, and they are 
more concerned with the concrete outcome of aid projects. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Managing China and Riding the Oil Wave 
The increased Chinese engagement with Africa presents African states with an 
‘alternative’ to the DAC and Washington, with the Ghana case showing how leaders can 
‘triangulate’ between donors. This ‘triangulation’, which is not simply a rejection of western 
donors and their conditions, gives African states options for the first time since the end of 
the cold war. It is this leverage that the Chinese offer and the potential that resources 
could flow elsewhere that are really exercising western critics. Yet in doing so they gain 
no friends in Africa by repeating the patronising message that Africans need saving from 
some venal power, when Africans are sorely aware of what venal powers have done, and 
continue to do, across the continent. Moreover, in welcoming the non-interference policy, 
African leaders are more willing to look to the Chinese model of economic development 
                                                 
4 See http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/annexed-by-china-ndash-for-good-or-ill-2095450.html. 
5 See http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/artikel.php?ID=194112. 
6 Interview, 13/I/2009. 
7 Interview, 2/XII/2008. 
8 See http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/Whitfield%20Jones%20Final.pdf. 
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for guidance given that it is clearly successful and is not being forced upon African 
countries as a condition of aid. 
 
For African states like Ghana the key is how to manage Asian engagement strategically 
and sustainably. The Bui Dam and potential deals like the STX project have limited local 
multipliers and could actively undermine local firms. And if these are bridgeheads into the 
local economy then longer term deindustrialisation could occur. However, the 
enforcement of labour and union laws in the Bui Dam project suggests that gains can be 
leveraged where a relatively strong institutional environment exists. Yet oil revenues 
could, if managed improperly and for party political gain, undermine the progress that 
Ghana has made. 
 
OECD donors need to recognise China as a serious contender when engaging with 
developing countries. They should increase the efficiency of their development processes 
going beyond only aid, increasing the cooperation between different donors and delivering 
on their commitments. China may also need to increase its cooperation with other donors 
and its emphasis on growth and infrastructure seems to have cajoled other donors back 
into these sectors making for the possibility of collaboration. China will also need to learn 
that aid can increase unsustainable debt and allow the postponement of necessary 
reforms. But whatever the outcomes in Ghana and the rest of Africa China’s entry signals 
a major shift in the political economy of aid and with it the theoretical assumptions about 
what ultimately drives development. 
 
Giles Mohan 
Reader in the Politics of International Development at the Open University in the UK 
 
